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  Regional monetary and financial cooperation among the monetary authorities 
of Asian countries have been further strengthening through the recent global financial 
crisis in 2007-2008. Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the ASEAN 
Members States, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan and Korea (ASEAN plus 
three) and the monetary authority of Hong Kong, China announced that the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) agreement came into effect on March 24, 2010. 
They also reached agreement on establishing a surveillance office, which is called an 
ASEAN plus three Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) and would ensure 
technical details of regional surveillance. 
  The regional monetary cooperation in Asia has been discussed for years. For 
example, Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed both an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), 
which is a common currency basket computed as a weighted average of the thirteen 
ASEAN plus three currencies, and AMU Deviation Indicators (AMU DIs), which 
indicates deviation of each Asian currency in terms of the AMU compared with the 
benchmark rate. The AMU and the AMU DIs are considered as both surveillance 
measures under the Chiang Mai Initiative and coordinated exchange rate policies 
among Asian countries.   
  In this paper, we show that monitoring the AMU and the AMU DIs plays an 
important role in the regional surveillance process under the CMIM. By using daily and 
monthly data of AMU and AMU DIs in the period between January 2000 to June 2010, 
which are available in a website of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and 
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 Industry (RIETI), we examine their usefulness as a surveillance indicator. Our studies of 
AMU and AMU DIs confirm as follows: First, an AMU peg system stabilizes Nominal 
Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) of each Asian country. Second, the AMU and the AMU 
DIs could warn overvaluation or undervaluation for each of Asia currencies. Third, trade 
imbalances within the region have been growing as the AMU DIs have been widening. 
Forth, the AMU DIs could predict huge capital inflows and outflows for the Asian country. 
The above fact-findings support usefulness of using the AMU and the AMU DIs as 
surveillance indicators for monetary cooperation in Asia. 
 






  The Regional monetary and financial cooperation among the monetary 
authorities of Asian countries have been further strengthening through the recent global 
financial crisis in 2007-2008. The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the 
ASEAN Members States, People’ s Republic of China (PRC), Japan and Korea (ASEAN 
plus three) and the monetary authority of Hong Kong, China announced that the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Agreement has come into effect on March 24, 
2010. They also reached agreement on establishing a surveillance office in Singapore, 
which is called the ASEAN plus three Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). 
Financial Ministers of the ASEAN plus three now have to ensure that technical details 
are ironed out. The AMRO will monitor and analyze the regional economies, which will 
contribute to early detection of possible currency crises, swift implementation of 
remedial actions, and effective decision-making in the region.   
  The regional monetary cooperation in Asia has been discussed for years. It 
would be necessary not only for preventing possible currency crises in the future but 
also for keeping intra-regional capital flows and exchange rates stable. We should 
consider how we will promote the regional monetary cooperation. One way is to create a 
common currency basket (regional monetary unit, RMU) and use it for economic 
surveillance. A common currency basket system with a fluctuation band, which is similar 
to so-called "BBC rule" suggested by Williamson (2000), would be an effective way to 
detect exchange rate misalignment among Asian currencies. 
  Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed both an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), 
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 which is a common currency basket computed as a weighted average of thirteen Asian 
currencies, and AMU deviation indicators (AMU DIs), which indicates deviation of each 
Asian currency in terms of the AMU compared with the benchmark rate
1. The AMU and 
the AMU DIs are considered as both surveillance measures under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative and coordinated exchange rate policies among East Asian countries. In this 
paper, we show that monitoring the AMU and the AMU DIs plays an important role in the 
regional surveillance process under the CMIM. By using daily and monthly data of AMU 
and AMU DIs in the period between January 2000 to June 2010, which are available in 
a website of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), we 
consider them from the following standpoints: First, how did the AMU related with three 
major currencies, the US dollar, the euro and the yen? Second, how could they stabilize 
a nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)? Third, how did they predict any currency 
crisis during the Asian currency crisis and during the recent 2007-2008 crisis? 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview 
of previous researches for a common currency basket proposal for Asian countries. 
Section 3 investigates the AMU and its relationship with the three major currencies. 
Section 4 focuses on comparison between a NEER calculated by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and a NEER under the hypothetical AMU peg system. 
The comparisons tell us how the AMU stabilizes NEER of Asian currencies. Section 5 
investigates The AMU and the AMU DIs during the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 
during the recent global financial crisis in 2007-2008. Finally, section 6 summarizes our 
analytical results and presents the conclusion. 
 
                                                      
1  For details on AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators, see Appendix. 
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 2. Related researches about a common currency basket in Asia 
 
  Some of Asian countries, which include Singapore and Malaysia (since July 
2005), have adopted a currency system in line with a Basket, Band and Crawling (BBC) 
rule
2 after the Asian currency crisis. During the recent global financial crisis in 
2007-2008, however, a number of Asian currencies depreciated sharply while the 
Japanese yen has been appreciating against the other Asian currencies. At the same 
time, the Chinese yuan has been kept stabilizing especially against the US dollar 
although the Chinese government announced to adopt a managed floating exchange 
rate system with reference to a currency basket. As a result, movements in 
intra-regional exchange rates among Asian currencies have changed dramatically. Such 
a large fluctuation of the intra-regional exchange rates is undesirable for the Asian 
economy where private sector has established production networks.   
  Since the Asian economy has de facto increasing interdependency in terms of 
intra-regional trade and foreign direct investments, it is indispensable to establish 
regional currency coordination in order to minimize exchange rate fluctuations or 
exchange rate risks in international trade and investments within the region. A proposed 
approach in this regard is to create a common currency basket, which will serve as an 
anchor for Asian currencies. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed the Asian Monetary 
Unit (AMU), which is computed as the weighted average of thirteen Asian currencies 
(ASEAN, People’ s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and Republic of Korea). Moreover, 
we have developed AMU Deviation Indicators based on the AMU in order to serve them 
for surveillance over fluctuations and misalignments of intra-regional exchange rates 
                                                      
2  The BBC rule was proposed by Williamson (2000). 
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 under the Chiang Mai Initiative.
3 The AMU Deviation Indicators are employed as 
benchmarks for enabling the monetary authorities of the Asian countries to keep their 
regional coordination in exchange rate policies. The monetary authorities could ensure 
that each of Asian currencies does not so much deviate from a common currency 
basket or the AMU. This would enable the Asian countries to achieve stability of 
intra-regional exchange rates and float jointly against outside currencies which include 
the US dollar and euro. Ogawa and Shimizu (2007) proposed a step-wise approach for 
transitioning from an individual currency basket system to a common currency basket 
system in Asia as an indicative proposal. 
  There is another proposal to stabilize the intra-regional exchange rates among 
Asian currencies without depending on any common currency basket. For example, Ma 
and McCauley (2008) suggest that stability of intra-Asian exchange rates might build on 
similar national policies of stabilizing home currencies against their own respective 
currency baskets because of their similarities of trade-weighted currency basket. 
Similarly, Wyplosz and Park (2008) advocate adopting own currency basket peg 
vis-à-vis its non-regional trade partners, which would be enough to stabilize the 
exchange rate. Both of the papers indicate that effective exchange rates of Asian 
currencies can be stabilized without any further monetary cooperation. Shimizu and 
Ogawa (2009) obtain an analytical result that we have a strong relationships among 
NEER, the AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators even during the period of global financial 
crisis. It suggests that an individual basket system is appropriate for Asian countries at 
                                                      
3 Such a unit has also been extensively discussed in East Asia, for example, in the ADB 
(Kuroda and Kawai, 2003). The data of AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators has been 
published on the website of RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html) since 
September 2005. 
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 the first stage of exchange rate policy coordination. In this sense, it seems that the 
above-mentioned proposals are not essentially different at least as the first step. 
 
3. Decomposition of the AMU 
 
  Currency regimes that are adopted by Asian countries are different with each 
other and their choices are broad ranging from a hard peg (a currency board), a 
managed float (with reference to a currency basket) to a free float. In other word, Asian 
currencies' degree of linkage with the US dollar vary from very strong (under a hard peg 
to the US dollar), weak (under a soft peg to the US dollar) to no relationship (under a 
free float). The AMU also has some degree of linkage with the US dollar because it is 
composed of the thirteen Asian currencies. Movements in the AMU should reflect the 
choice of currency regime in the region. 
Following the methods of Frankel and Wei (1994), we identify estimated 
coefficients on the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen for the AMU to investigate 
how strong linkages the AMU has the three major currencies. We use daily data of 
exchange rates to estimate the following regression equation for each year of full 
sample period from 2000 to 2010.
4 
 
Sfr Yen e /  Sfr Euro Sfr USD o Sfr AMU c e c e c c e 3 / 2 / 1 /          
 
If Asian countries actually shift their currency regimes from the strict or de fatco US 
dollar peg system to an individual currency basket system, the AMU's linkage with the 
US dollar becomes weaker and at the same time its relationship with the euro becomes 
                                                      
4  In the sample of 2010, we use daily data from Jan 4 to June 30, 2010. The data of foreign 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU are from RIETI and Datastream.   
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 stronger. Since the Japanese yen is one of the composition currencies of the AMU, a 
coefficient on the Japanese yen should be the same as a weight of the Japanese yen in 
the AMU. However, if an estimated coefficient is smaller than the basket weight, it 
means that the monetary authorities of the other Asian countries conduct an exchange 
rate policy without caring about any stability against the Japanese yen. In this regards, 
linkages of the AMU with the three major currencies reflects currency regime or 
exchange rate policy adopted by the monetary authorities of the Asian countries. 
  Table 1 summarizes the analytical results of the regression. Figure 1 plots 
movements in the estimated coefficients of the three major currencies year by year. In 
the sub-sample periods from 2000 to 2005, coefficients on the US dollar decreased from 
70% to 58%. On one hand, coefficients on the Japanese yen increased from 32% to 
37%. Coefficients on the euro became significant in 2003 and 2004 even though they 
are just about 5%. The analytical results indicate that the Asian countries shifted from 
the US dollar peg system to an individual basket peg system.   
However, in the sub-sample periods from 2006 to 2009, coefficients on the US 
dollar and the euro increased from 63% to 68% and from 8% to 15 % in 2008, 
respectively. In contrast, coefficients on the Japanese yen decreased from 31% to 21%. 
The analytical results indicate that Asian countries shifted back to a pro-US dollar 
foreign exchange rate policy or a US dollar peg system again. Comparison with 
estimated coefficients on the Japanese yen and its basket weight in the AMU shows that 
the former (37.63) was larger than the later (27.80) in 2005. However the former (21.23) 
was smaller than the latter (26.44) in 2010. The analytical results suggest that the 
monetary authorities of the other Asian countries shifted from a pro-Japanese yen 
9 
 foreign exchange rate policy to a pro-US dollar exchange rate policy recently.
5 
  Adopting own individual currency basket peg system would contribute to 
stabilization of the intra-regional foreign exchange rates among the Asian currencies in 
the future as the related researches in the previous suggested. However, their current 
exchange rate policy is still far from an individual currency basket system in spite that 
the monetary authorities should target not heavily the US dollar but a currency basket. 
This is why we need to use some common indicators, such as the AMU and the AMU 
Deviation Indicators, for surveillance over intra-regional exchange rates. 
 
4. How could the AMU stabilize effective exchange rates? 
 
  There are some previous researches which investigate stabilization effects of a 
common currency basket peg system on effective exchange rates of the Asian 
currencies. For example, Williamson (2005) investigated whether use of a common 
currency basket would provide adequate stability of effective exchange rate of the 
participating country currencies. He supposed two exchange rate systems, which 
include an individual currency basket peg system and a common G3 currency basket 
peg system. He showed that the latter system could relatively stabilize NEERs of Asian 
currencies compared with the former system. Similarly, Ogawa and Shimizu (2006) 
simulated how NEERs would have moved under alternative exchange rate systems 
which include an individual currency basket system, a G3 common currency basket 
system and an AMU peg system by using data of exchange rates of Asian currencies 
vis-à-vis the AMU during a sample period from 2000 to 2004. They obtained an 
                                                      
5  Given the strong linkage of the Chinese yuan with the US dollar, it can be interpreted that 
Asian countries shifted to a pro-Chinese yuan exchange rate policy. 
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 analytical result that the AMU peg system stabilizes the NEERs more effectively for 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, and Thailand than the other peg systems.   
  In this paper, we extend the sample period from January 2005 and June 2010 
to investigate the stabilization effects of the AMU peg system on NEERs of East Asian 
currencies while we base on Ogawa and Shimizu (2006). Specifically, we compare 
standard deviations of NEERs under a hypothetical AMU peg system with those of 
NEERs that are calculated by the BIS (2005=100). Exchange rates of the Asian 
currencies in terms of the AMU, which are standardized as 100 in January 2005, are 
used to simulate NEERs under the hypothetical AMU peg system. Basket weights on 
each currency of NEER are same as those of NEERs that are calculated by the BIS. 
  Table 2 summarizes the analytical results. Standard deviations of the NEERs 
under the hypothetical AMU peg system are lower than those of actual (historical) 
NEER calculated by the BIS. Accordingly, we obtain an analytical result that the AMU 
peg system stabilizes the NEER of Asian currencies even during the global financial 
crisis. We also find that differentials in the standard deviations between actual NEERs 
and AMU-peg NEERs vary by country. For example, in the case of Singapore, the 
standard deviation of NEER calculated by the BIS was 3.728 while that of NEER under 
the hypothetical AMU peg system was 2.321. Similarly, in the case of Malaysia, the 
standard deviation of NEER calculated by the BIS was 2.699 while that of NEER under 
the hypothetical AMU peg system was 1.677. Thus, the differences are small in the case 
of Singapore and Malaysia that adopt a managed floating exchange rate system with 
reference to a currency basket. On the other hand, in the case of Republic of Korea that 
adopts free floating exchange rate system, the standard deviation of NEER calculated 
by the BIS was 13.038 while that of NEER under the hypothetical AMU peg system was 
11 
 1.160. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, the standard deviation of NEER calculated by 
the BIS was 7.785 while that of NEER under the hypothetical AMU peg system was 
1.630. The results indicate that the NEER of free floating currencies would become 
dramatically more stable if the monetary authorities adopt an AMU peg system.   
  Figure 2 plots movements in the above two kinds of NEER as well as a nominal 
exchange rate in terms of the US dollar for reference in a period between January 2005 
and June 2010 by country. In the case of People’s Republic of China (PRC), an actual 
NEER calculated by the BIS appreciated more than 10 % during the global financial 
crisis (2007-2008) although a nominal exchange rate of the Chinese yuan in terms of 
the US dollar was kept very stable. If the monetary authority of People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) adopted the AMU peg system in the same period, the Chinese yuan would 
appreciate less than half in terms of the NEER. In the case of Republic of Korea, both 
the actual NEER calculated by the BIS and the nominal exchange rate of the Korean 
won in terms of the US dollar depreciated more than 30% during the global financial 
crisis. If the monetary authority of Republic of Korea adopted the AMU peg system in 
the same period, their NEER would be kept very stable. The analytical results suggest 
that the AMU peg system would stabilize the NEER of Asian currencies even during the 
global financial crisis. 
 
5. AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators during the Crises 
 
  Our researches use the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators (DIs) to 
conduct macro-economic analysis for surveillance purposes. In this section, we have a 
particular focus on the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the recent global financial crisis 
12 
 in 2007-2008. We investigate how accurately The AMU and the AMU DIs showed crisis 
situation during the two crises. 
 
5-1. AMU during the Asian currency crisis in 1997 
 
  At first, we retroact both the AMU and the AMU DIs in the period around the 
Asian currency crisis in 1997 before the benchmark period 2000-2001
6. Figure 3 shows 
the movements of the AMU in terms of the US dollar, the euro (weighted average of 
European currencies before January 1999) and the US$-euro basket currency from 
January 1995 to the end of 2000. In 1996, exchange rate of the AMU in terms of the 
euro was at around 1.0 while the exchange rate in terms of the US dollar was larger 
than 1.2, given that the benchmark period for the exchange rates was 2000-2001.. It 
means that the AMU was more than 20 percent overvalued vis-à-vis the US dollar 
compared with the AMU benchmark year (2000-2001) in the period before the Asian 
crisis.  
  Figure 4 shows movements in AMU DIs of some Asian currencies before and 
after the Asian currency crisis. It is clear that AMU DIs of crisis-hit currencies were 
overvalued before the Asian currency crisis. Particularly, an AMU DI of the Indonesian 
rupiah had the largest overvaluation among the Asian currencies (Figure 4-(a)). Figure 
4-(b) shows that AMU DIs of the Thai baht and the Malaysian ringgit were also more 
than 20 % overvalued. On one hand, an AMU DI of the Korean won was below 10 % 
overvalued when the Thai baht started to collapse in July 1997. After then, it climbed 
gradually up to 17% of overvaluation. It started to depreciate sharply to almost minus 
                                                      
6 For the calculation of the AMU and AMU DIs backward in 1990s, we use the simulated 
euro before the introduction of the euro. 
13 
 40% of undervaluation in December 1997. Thus, the movements in the AMU DIs 
showed an exact scenario of currency crisis contagion from Thailand to Republic of 
Korea. In contrast, AMU DIs of the Singapore dollar, the Chinese yuan and the 
Japanese yen were undervalued before the Asian currency crisis. Especially, those of 
the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen were below minus 20 of undervaluation, which 
means that the crisis-hit currencies were more than 40 % overvalued compared with the 
two major Asian currencies. 
  When we watch movements in both The AMU and the AMU DIs during the 
Asian currency crisis, we can find that the AMU was more than 20 percent overvalued 
vis-à-vis the US dollar and the crisis-hit currencies were more than 40 % overvalued 
compared with the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen. These results suggest that the 
monetary authority should monitor The AMU and the AMU DIs to find any signs for 
predicting a currency crisis in the near future. 
 
5-2. AMU during the recent global financial crisis in 2007-2008 
 
  Some of Asian currencies have been depreciating against the US dollar as a 
result of the sell-off of local currencies accompanying the capital outflows related with 
deleveraging by US and European financial institutions since 2007. It dramatically 
happened since the Lehman shock on September 15, 2008. The only exception was the 
Japanese yen, which has appreciated substantially against the US dollar. The Chinese 
yuan has been kept relatively stable vis-à-vis the US dollar by the Chinese monetary 
authority’s heavy intervention in foreign exchange market even during the global 
financial period. The Singapore dollar and the Malaysia ringgit also have not so much 
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 depreciated against the US dollar because the monetary authorities has kept a currency 
basket system. In contrast, the Korean won has had much larger depreciation than any 
other Asian currency. The Thai baht and the Indonesian rupiah also have depreciated 
due to the sub-prime mortgage problem and fallout from the Lehman Brothers' demise.   
  Figure 5 shows movements in AMU DIs from January 2000 to March 2010. It is 
clear that the Asian currencies have been widening in terms of increasing weighted 
averages of AMU DIs as Ogawa and Yoshimi (2008) pointed out. The increasing 
weighted averages of AMU DIs might reflect in regional trade imbalances in some 
extents since the benchmark period to calculate AMU DIs is set as the period when total 
trade balances (intra-regional trade balances) of the Asian countries was the closest to 
zero., Figure 6 shows movements in trade balances within the region by country from 
1st quarter of 2000 to 4th quarter of 2009. Trade imbalances within the region have 
been growing as the weighted average of AMU DIs was increasing. Especially, a large 
surplus trend of regional trade balance suddenly turned to a large deficit once the 
subprime crisis happened in the 3rd quarter of 2008. The fact-findings suggest us that 
sudden and volatile movements in the AMU DIs have negative impacts on the 
intra-regional trades among the Asian countries. 
  The volatile movements in the AMU DIs also might be caused by erratic capital 
flows. Suppose that we set a plus/minus 15％ of fluctuation band of AMU DIs where 
plus/minus 15％ of fluctuation band is the same as the fluctuation band in Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) II in the EU. Figure 5 shows that most of the Asian currencies 
except for the Philippine peso were kept within the band during a period from 2000 to 
2005. Since 2006, however, an AMU DI of the Korean won started to rise beyond the 
upper band of 15% while the Thai baht and the Singapore dollar followed this upward 
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 trend. In contrast, an AMU DI of the Japanese yen was undervalued.   
What caused the currencies to deviate from their benchmark level? One 
possible answer is a carry trade between the Japanese yen and other currencies. The 
Japanese yen was highly involved into carry trade strategies as a funding currency 
because of their continuing extremely low interest rates in 2000’s
7. Higher interest rates 
for other Asian currencies which include the Korean won and the Thai baht were no 
exception as an investing currency of yen related carry trade. As Gyntelberg (2009) 
indicates that net purchases of Thai equities by non-resident investors lead to 
appreciation of the Thai baht in 2007, the movements in capital flows is one of the 
important factors to destabilize the intra-regional exchange rate
8.  
  In the rest of this section, we investigate relationships between the AMU DIs 
and capital flows. We focus on three volatile Asian currencies which include the Korean 
won, the Indonesian rupiah and the Thailand baht to compare their AMU DIs and capital 
flows, especially “Other Investments” in the balance of payments by using data from the 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. Figure 7 shows relationships between the AMU 
DIs and the “Other Investments” for the three countries.   
In the case of Korea, the AMU DI went up gradually from the middle of 2004 
and was kept above 15% during a period from the 2nd quarter of 2006 to 4th quarter of 
2007. In this period, Korea had large capital inflows at a liability side of "Other 
Investments". In the 3rd quarter of 2008, the AMU DI of the Korean won sharply went 
down below minus 15 % of undervaluation. At the same time, large capital outflows 
                                                      
7 Hottori and Shin (2007) confirmed that the volumes of carry trade involving the yen were 
high when interest differential against the yen were high.   
8 Plantin and Shin (2006) express that a high-yield currency will go “up by the stairs” and 
come “down with the elevator”. 
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 occurred at both a liability and asset side of "Other Investment".   
In the case of Indonesia, large capital outflows occurred at an asset side of 
"Other Investments" in the 3rd quarter of 2008 while the AMU DI of the Indonesian 
rupiah went down below 15 % of undervaluation.   
The case of Thailand is different from the formers. When the AMU DI of the 
Thai baht climbed up above 15% of overvaluation during a period from the 1st quarter of 
2007 to the 1st quarter of 2008, Thailand had no large capital inflows except in the 1st 
quarter of 2008. It is because the capital controls which was suddenly introduced by the 
Bank of Thailand in December 2006 and eliminated on March 3, 2008. Actually, the Thai 
baht did not sharply depreciate like the other two currencies during the recent global 
financial crisis 2007-2008.   
These fact-findings indicate that the AMU DI's reach to an upper band, for 
example plus 15% of fluctuation band, could alert the excess capital inflows that might 
cause capital outflows afterward. Thus, monitoring the AMU DIs is useful to predict the 




  In this paper, we showed that monitoring the AMU and the AMU DIs plays an 
important role in the regional surveillance process in Asia. Daily and monthly data of 
AMU and AMU DIs are used to make surveillance over intra-regional exchange rates 
among the Asian currencies. Our investigation of the AMU and the AMU DIs showed the 
following fact-findings: First, the AMU peg system stabilizes NEERs of East Asian 
currencies. Second, the AMU and the AMU DIs during the period just before the Asian 
17 
 currency crisis in 1997 shows that a weighted average of the Asian currencies was 
overvalued against the US dollar while the currencies of crisis-hit countries also were 
overvalued against the other Asian currencies. Thus, both the AMU and the AMU DIs 
could alert the overvaluation of the Asian currencies before the Asian currency crisis. 
Third, trade imbalances within the region were growing as the AMU DIs were widening 
among the Asian currencies. Forth, the AMU DIs could predict the excess capital inflows 
into the countries and capital outflows from the countries. The fact-findings support the 
usefulness of using both the AMU and the AMU DIs as a surveillance indicator for 
monetary cooperation in Asia. 
  A practical way to utilize the AMU DI as a surveillance indicator will be 
discussed continuously as a future issue. For example, how to decide a fluctuation band 
of the AMU DI is an important issue. In order to decide the fluctuation band, we need to 
analyze the relationship between interest differentials and capital inflows/outflows. This 
paper focused on the AMU and the AMU DIs only in terms of nominal exchange rates. 
The nominal AMU and AMU DIs are suit for daily surveillance over nominal exchange 
rates and capital inflows/outflows while we need to use The AMU and the AMU DI in 
terms of real exchange rates for macroeconomic surveillances over exports imports, 
and trade balances as well as foreign direct investments. These remain issues to be 
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Appendix: The AMU and AMU Deviation Indicator 
 
i.  Calculating the AMU 
  We calculated the AMU according to the approach employed for calculating the 
European Currency Unit (ECU) under the EMS before the introduction of the euro in 
1999. Just as the ECU was defined as a basket of currencies of member countries of 
the European Union (EU), the AMU has been defined as a basket of currencies of the 
ASEAN 10+3 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
and Republic of Korea). The weight assigned to each currency in this basket is based 
on the share of GDP measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), and overall trade 
volumes (the sum of exports and imports) of each sample country. We calculated the 
share of GDP measured at PPP and trade volumes for each country using the average 
of the last three years in order to arrive at the currency shares of the AMU (the current 
version is based on 2005-2007).   
Since both the United States and EU countries are important trading partners for East 
Asia, the AMU is quoted in terms of a weighted average of the US dollar and euro. The 
weighted average of the US dollar and the euro (hereafter, US$-euro) is based on the 
trade volumes of East Asian countries with the United States and EU. The weights 
assigned to the US dollar and euro were 65% and 35%, respectively. 
  Subsequently, a benchmark period in order to calculate AMU Deviation 
Indicators was determined. The benchmark period was defined in the following manner. 
The total trade balance of member countries (intra-regional trade balance), total trade 
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 balance of the member countries (excluding Japan) with Japan, and total trade balance 
of member countries with the rest of world must be approximately zero. Consequently, it 
was found that the trade balance in 2001 was the closest to zero. Assuming a one-year 
time lag before changes in exchange rates affect trade volumes, we chose 2000 and 
2001 as the benchmark period. For the benchmark period, the exchange rate of the 
AMU in terms of the US$-euro was set at unity. We defined the exchange rate of each 
East Asian currency in terms of the AMU during the benchmark period as the 
benchmark exchange rate. 
  Overall, the AMU weights were calculated based on both the arithmetic share 
of trade volumes and GDP measured at PPP. The table below indicates the AMU basket 
weights and benchmark exchange rates. 
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 ―  AMU Basket Weights of East Asian Currencies  ― 
(revised in 10/2010****, benchmark year=2000/2001)
Trade












Brunei     0.35 0.13 0.24 0.589114 0.0041
Cambodia 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.000270 6.9779
China 26.48 46.65 36.57 0.125109 2.9228
Indonesia 5.68 5.54 5.61 0.000113 497.9163
Japan 22.40 28.15 25.28 0.009065 27.8842
South Korea 13.03 8.27 10.65 0.000859 123.9422
Laos 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.000136 7.5226
Malaysia 7.37 2.36 4.87 0.272534 0.1786
Myanmar 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.159215 0.0232
Philippines 2.22 1.95 2.09 0.021903 0.9527
Singapore 12.74 1.48 7.11 0.589160 0.1207
Thailand 6.54 3.41 4.98 0.024543 2.0272
Vietnam 2.48 1.44 1.96 0.000072 273.9808
**** : AMU shares and weights were reviced in Oct. 2010. This is the 6th version.
Source: RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html)
* : The trade volume is calculated as the average of total export and import volumes in 2006, 2007 and
2008 taken from DOTS (IMF).
**: GDP measured at PPP is the average of GDP measured at PPP in 2006, 2007 and 2008 taken from
the World Development Report, World Bank. For Myanmar's share of GDP measured at PPP, we use the
sahre of Trade volume because of the data constraint.
*** : The Benchmark exchange rate ($-euro/Currency) is the average of the daily exchange rate in terms
of US$-euro in 2000 and 2001.
 
 
ii.  Calculating the AMU Deviation Indicator 
  The nominal exchange rate of each East Asian currency in terms of the AMU is 
used in order to determine its AMU Deviation Indicator. The AMU Deviation Indicator 
signifies the deviation of each East Asian currency from the benchmark exchange rate, 
vis-à-vis the AMU and is represented by a formula in the following manner:   
. 100
currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange benchmark 
currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange benchmark  currency   a
AMU   of   rate   exchange   actual









currency A’s actual exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU is higher than its benchmark 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU (this represents an appreciation of currency A against 
the AMU). Similarly, when the AMU deviation indicator of say, currency A is negative, it 
implies that the currency A’s actual exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU is lower than its 
benchmark exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU (this represents a depreciation of currency 
A against the AMU). Table 1. AMU de-composition with three major currencies   
Dependent Variable: AMU/SFR
Method: Least Squares
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Constant 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
US dollar 0.7046 *** 0.7080 *** 0.6496 *** 0.6511 *** 0.6302 *** 0.5844 *** 0.6361 *** 0.6754 *** 0.6865 *** 0.6472 *** 0.6808 ***
Euro 0.0153 -0.0106 -0.0321 0.0509 ** 0.0516 ** 0.0408 0.0830 * 0.1499 *** 0.1544 *** 0.1210 *** 0.0996 ***
Japanese yen 0.3219 *** 0.3267 *** 0.3177 *** 0.3298 *** 0.3462 *** 0.3763 *** 0.3109 *** 0.2238 *** 0.2254 *** 0.2584 *** 0.2123 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.9812 0.9793 0.9691 0.9814 0.9911 0.9719 0.9577 0.9458 0.9528 0.9737 0.9429
Autuors' calculation.
Source: The Data of foreign exchange rate vis-à-vis the AMU are from RIETI and Datastream.
Note:  *** significant at 1% level    ** sigunificant at 5% level   * significant at 10% level  
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 Table 2. The standard deviation of NEER (BIS) and NEER simulated under AMU peg 
system, (Monthly data, January 2005 to June 2010) 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 8.280 2.715
Indonesia 7.785 1.630
Japan 7.968 2.773






(1) Standard deviations of month end nominal effective exchange rates calculated by BIS.
(January 2005=100).
(2) Nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) under the hypothetical AMU peg system are
simulated by using each exchange rate vis-a-vis the AMU which is standardized 100 in
January 2005. The basket weights of NEER are same as those of NEER calculated by BIS.
Country NEER (BIS) (1)
NEER simulated under the
AMU peg system (2)
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Note: AMU exchange rates are downloaded from RIETI. NEER (BIS) are downloaded from 
BIS. Nominal exchange rates are downloaded from Datastream. 
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 Figure 4. The AMU Deviation Indicators in Asian Crisis (March 1997 to December 1998) 












































































































































































  (Authors’ calculation) 
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Source: RIETI (http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html) 
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Figure 6. The Trade Balance with ASEAN, Japan, Republic of Korea,   































































































































































































































































Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. 
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Source: Data of capital flow are from IFS (IMF). Data of AMU DIs are from RIETI. 
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